A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powers Jurisprudence Or A Valid Exercise Of Federal Powers? Executive order 13768 And Its Effects on Florida Localities by Macelloni, Davide
Nova Law Review
Volume 42, Issue 1 2018 Article 5
A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering
Principle And Spending Powers Jurisprudence
Or A Valid Exercise Of Federal Powers?
Executive order 13768 And Its Effects on
Florida Localities
Davide Macelloni∗
∗
Copyright c©2018 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering
Principle And Spending Powers Jurisprudence
Or A Valid Exercise Of Federal Powers?
Executive order 13768 And Its Effects on
Florida Localities
Davide Macelloni
Abstract
On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s Embarcadero. The
killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco Lopez- Sanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple
felonies, who had already been deported from the United States on five different occasions
A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE
AND SPENDING POWERS JURISPRUDENCE OR A VALID
EXERCISE OF FEDERAL POWERS?  EXECUTIVE ORDER
13768 AND ITS EFFECTS ON FLORIDA LOCALITIES 
DAVIDE MACELLONI* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 96 
II. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS ............................................................ 98
A. Historical Development:  From Its Biblical Origin . . . ...... 98 
B. . . . To Its Modern American Application . . ..................... 100 
C. . . . And Its Contemporary Version ................................... 101 
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE ................................................................. 105
A. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the 
United States ..................................................................... 106 
B. Section Nine—The Source of Discord ............................... 107 
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 ................................................................. 108 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES ......................................................... 109
A. Spending Clause ............................................................... 111 
1. Clarity of Intent .................................................... 113
2. Nexus Requirement .............................................. 115
3. Coercion ............................................................... 116
B. Tenth Amendment Umbrella ............................................. 118 
1. Anti-Commandeering .......................................... 119
a. ICE Detainers ......................................... 120
b. Police Powers ......................................... 122
V. FLORIDA LOCALITIES ..................................................................... 129 
A. Miami-Dade County.......................................................... 132 
1. Lacroix v. Junior .................................................. 133
2. Creedle v. Gimenez .............................................. 134
B. What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida 
Jurisdictions? .................................................................... 135 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 136
1
Macelloni: A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powe
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
96 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s 
Embarcadero.
1
  The killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco Lopez-
Sanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple felonies, who had already 
been deported from the United States on five different occasions.
2
  The 
murder only added fuel to the fire of the immigration debate, shifting the 
general public’s attention to immigration policies and enforcement.3  The 
main object of discussion has since been sanctuary jurisdictions—and 
sanctuary policies in general.
4
  An obscure object to most, sanctuary policies 
define the relationship between states and local jurisdictions and the federal 
government with regards to immigrant residents.
5
  Specifically, sanctuary 
policies often limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement 
actions and are implemented by many of the largest cities in the country.
6
  
However, perception of sanctuary policies varies among different sides of the 
political spectrum.
7
  While some believe sanctuary policies foster criminal 
                                                     
* Davide Macelloni received his B.A., summa cum laude, in Political 
Science from Florida Atlantic University in 2014 and is a J.D. Candidate for May 2018 at 
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law.  The author would like to 
thank his wife, Jocelyne, for her unwavering support and unconditional love.  He would also 
like to thank his parents, Marcello and Giovanna, his sister, Laura, and his grandfather, 
Claudio, for always believing in him and encouraging him, even from thousands of miles 
away.  The author also thanks his fellow associates and board members of the Nova Law 
Review for their dedication to this Comment.  Lastly, he dedicates this Comment to his 
birthplace, Rome, Caput Mundi. 
1. Christina Littlefield, Sanctuary Cities:  How Kathryn Steinle’s Death 
Intensified the Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle-
20150723-htmlstory.html. 
2. Julia Preston, Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A10; David Bier, Kate Steinle and San Francisco’s “Sanctuary 
City” Policy, CATO INST.: CATO LIBERTY (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:54 PM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/kate-steinle-san-franciscos-sanctuary-city-policy. 
3. See Jerry Markon, California Killing Inflames Debate on Illegal 
Immigrants, ‘Sanctuary Cities’, WASH. POST: POL. (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-killing-inflames-debate-on-illegal-immigrants-
sanctuary-cities/2015/07/06/8dc6eb50-241e-11e5-b72c-2b7d516e1e0e_story.html. 
4. See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, 
CNN: POL. (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-
cities-explained/index.html; Littlefield, supra note 1; Janell Ross, 6 Big Things to Know About 
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST: FIX (July 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/07/08/4-big-things-to-know-about-sanctuary-cities-and-illegal-immigration/. 
5. See Kopan, supra note 4. 
6. Id. 
7. See Loren Collingwood et al., Sanctuary Cities Do Not Experience an 
Increase in Crime, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/sanctuary-cities-do-not-
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activities and hot-beds for gang violence and drug-trafficking, others affirm 
the exact opposite, claiming sanctuary jurisdictions to be safer and more 
cooperative with law enforcement.
8
  The Executive Branch of the federal 
government interprets the issue in agreement with the former position.
9
 
On January 25, 2017, the newly elected President of the United 
States, Donald J. Trump, signed Executive Order 13768 titled “Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (“Executive Order”).10  
The Executive Order targets sanctuary jurisdictions in an attempt to foster 
cooperation between federal and state law enforcement agencies in the fight 
against illegal immigration.
11
  Sanctuary jurisdictions have in fact been 
accused by the White House of defying United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) orders.12  The Executive Order specifically 
targets violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which forbids restrictions on the 
sharing of information regarding citizenship or immigration status of 
individuals with ICE.
13
 
Advocates of the Executive Order argue that implementation of its 
policies would improve the safety of citizens throughout the United States 
and further allow a more efficient execution of federal laws and statutes 
regarding immigration.
14
  Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Executive 
Order infringes upon constitutional rights of state and local jurisdictions by 
exercising powers—not constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch of 
government—in violation of the fundamental principle of separation of 
                                                                                                                             
experience-an-increase-in-crime/; William Lajeunesse, Sessions Says When Cities Protect 
Illegal Immigrants, ‘Criminals Take Notice’, FOX NEWS: POL. (July 12, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/07/12/sessions-says-when-cities-protect-illegal-
immigrants-criminals-take-notice.html. 
8. See Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants:  
Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, 2017 CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. & 
POL. BRIEF 1–2; Lajeunesse, supra note 7. 
9. See Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?, 
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-
cities-donald-trump/. 
10. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799, 8803 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
11. See id. at 8799. 
12. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The White House’s Claim That ‘Sanctuary’ 
Cities Are Violating the Law, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (April 28, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/04/28/the-white-houses-claim-
that-sanctuary-cities-are-violating-the-law/. 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
14. See Tal Kopan, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Declaring War on 
Sanctuary Cities, CNN: POL. (June 29, 2017, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/kates-law-sanctuary-cities-house-bill-
immigration/index.html. 
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powers.
15
  Critics, in fact, affirm that ordering Congress to withhold federal 
funding, one aspect of the Executive Order, as punishment for the failure to 
comply with federal immigration laws, is an unconstitutional form of 
coercion in violation of the Tenth Amendment—which prohibits the federal 
government from forcing states and local governments to enforce federal 
laws.
16
 
Jurisdictions across the country have responded differently to 
President Trump’s Executive Order:  Cities like Los Angeles and New York 
promised to stand behind their sanctuary policies, while Miami-Dade County 
retracted its sanctuary policy.
17
 
Part II of this Comment will illustrate the historical development of 
sanctuary jurisdictions from their biblical origin to the most recent 
application in the western legal system, specifically in the United States.
18
  
Part III introduces the language of the Executive Order and its connections to 
the statute that it is designed to enforce.
19
  Part IV analyzes, in depth, the 
possible constitutional challenges to the Executive Order, and the arguments 
both in favor and against its constitutionality.
20
  Finally, Part V of this 
Comment will consider the possible repercussions of the provisions within 
the Executive Order in Florida, with particular attention paid to the South 
Florida region, historically home to thousands of immigrants.
21
 
II. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS 
A. Historical Development:  From Its Biblical Origin . . . 
The concept of a sanctuary dates back to at least biblical times, and 
was originally rooted in the power of religious authorities to grant protection 
within an inviolable religious area or structure to persons fearing for their 
                                                     
15. See Devin Watkins, 5 Ways Trump’s Anti-Sanctuary City Orders Are 
Unconstitutional, TIME: LAW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.time.com/4720749/trump-
sanctuary-cities-unconstitutional/. 
16. Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
17. See Henry Goldman, Sanctuary-City Mayors Vow to Defy Trump After He 
Threatens Funding, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threat-to-deny-funds-draws-
defiance-from-sanctuary-cities.  But see Ray Sanchez et al., Florida’s Largest County to 
Comply with Trump’s Sanctuary Crackdown, CNN: POL. (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/miami-dade-mayor-sanctuary-
crackdown/index.html. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V. 
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lives or liberty.
22
  Sanctuary practices existed in many Western societies, and 
were extensively used by ancient Hebrews after being freed from slavery in 
Egypt.
23
  Sanctuary practices were further used in both ancient Greece and 
Rome, with characteristics similar to the concept of asylum.
24
 
While originally granting asylum for all crimes, with many temples 
extending what was considered as divine protection, Greeks later reduced the 
use of asylum to individuals who had committed unpremeditated crimes.
25
  
Contrarily, sacred edifices in Rome were not sanctuaries.
26
  In fact, Romans 
only extended asylum to give immunity and protection from violence 
throughout the inquisition process.
27
  Once judgment on the evidence was 
rendered, the asylum would be revoked and punishment would be inflicted 
on the defendant found guilty of a crime.
28
  With the emergence of 
Christianity, the concept of sanctuary extended to a wider range of 
individuals.
29
  In 303 A.D., Constantine’s Edict of Toleration granted 
Christian churches permission to extend protection to fugitives.
30
  Sanctuary 
was later recognized as a legal right through the promulgation of the 
Theodosian Code by the emperor Theodosius in 392 A.D.
31
  Extensively 
used in medieval times—enjoying recognition in both Canon law and Saxon 
law—sanctuaries suffered as centralized governments increased throughout 
Europe, and Church and State clashed over its control.
32
  Resulting from the 
                                                     
22. Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary:  A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 583, 609 (2014); see also ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY 62 (1988); Michael Scott 
Feeley, Towards the Cathedral:  Ancient Sanctuary Represented in the American Context, 27 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 802 (1990).  “Sanctuary is the power of guardians of a defined 
religious site to grant protections to one who seeks safety out of fear of life or limb.”  Feeley, 
supra at 802.  Most ancient cultures, including Syrians and Phoenicians developed sanctuary 
towns and temples.  William C. Ryan, The Historical Case for the Right of Sanctuary, 29 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 209, 211, 211 n.20 (1987). 
23. Ryan, supra note 22, at 211. 
24. See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary:  The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a 
Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 
751 (1986) (analyzing the “[n]on-[b]iblical [o]rigins of [w]estern [s]anctuar[ies]”). 
25. Id. (affirming that sanctuary would also be extended to a person “in 
danger of cruel and summary vengeance”). 
26. Ryan, supra note 22, at 213–14. 
27. Carro, supra note 24, at 751. 
28. See id. 
29. Id. at 752. 
30. Davidson, supra note 22, at 587. 
31. Carro, supra note 24, at 752. 
32. Feeley, supra note 22, at 810; see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 216–18 
(discussing in depth the rise of the sanctuary privilege in Anglo-Saxon society and its 
development in English common law). 
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schism between the English Crown and the Catholic Church, the privilege of 
sanctuary came to an end in England in 1624.
33
 
B. . . . To Its Modern American Application . . . 
In the United States, sanctuaries by religious authorities against civil 
authorities were not invoked for almost 200 years.
34
  Prior to the American 
Civil War, clergymen and members of religious communities offered aid to 
slaves escaping bondage through an intricate system of routes known as the 
Underground Railroad.
35
  Although activism in the Underground Railroad 
was spread across religious figures and churches, no record exists of any 
church invoking the right to sanctuary.
36
  The first instance of the modern 
application of sanctuaries was during the Vietnam War, a military action that 
was strongly opposed by the religious community, which offered safe havens 
to draftees conscientiously resisting the draft.
37
  Although participants to the 
movement made no claim asserting legal recognition, the renewed concept of 
sanctuary was empowered by its characteristics of civil disobedience.
38
 
The current sanctuary movement in the United States developed in 
the 1980s when, after the enactment of the Refugee Act, “thousands of 
immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala” applied for asylum.39  As a 
consequence of asylum applications being routinely rejected by federal 
                                                     
33. Davidson, supra note 22, at 593; Feeley, supra note 22, at 810. 
34. IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND 
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 160 (1985); Davidson, supra note 22, at 594.  Early colonial 
history of the United States makes no mention of sanctuary privileges.  BAU, supra at 159.  
The inexistence of sanctuary privileges in the United States at the time was probably due to 
the fact that pilgrims considered America as a sanctuary in its entirety, and therefore saw no 
reason to formally adopt the privilege.  Id. at 158–59; James H. Walsh & Mary Ellen O’Neill, 
Sanctuary - A Legal Privilege or Act of Civil Disobedience?, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1987, at 11, 13. 
35. Davidson, supra note 22, at 594–95; see also Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, 
The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement:  A Comparison of History, 
Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1436, 1440–41 (1987) (drawing a thorough 
comparison between the Underground Railroad movement of the 1840s and 1850s to the 
sanctuary movement). 
36. Davidson, supra note 22, at 595. 
37. Id. at 597–98. 
38. Walsh & O’Neill, supra note 34, at 14. 
39. Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139 
(2008); see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine:  Trial Without Jury—A 
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 30–31 
(1986).  The two groundbreaking events igniting the civil war in El Salvador were the 
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador, murdered while saying mass, and 
the rape and murder of four American Catholic missionaries by National guardsmen.  Colbert, 
supra at 30–31 (explaining the unfolding of the sanctuary movement on behalf of Central 
American immigrants in the United States). 
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agencies, many churches across the country declared themselves sanctuaries 
to offer refuge to immigrants and protest against the policies of the federal 
government.
40
  In March of 1982, the Southside Presbyterian Church of 
Tucson, Arizona, was the first to publicly announce itself as a sanctuary for 
Central American immigrants fleeing war.
41
  In addition to offering 
protection, the churches and religious communities involved in the 
movement provided food, clothing, and legal services.
42
 
Following the wave of sanctuary initiatives ignited by churches and 
religious groups around the country, many local governments established 
sanctuary policies.
43
  Sanctuary laws passed by cities and states generally 
declared public places as sanctuaries.
44
  Jurisdictions that passed sanctuary 
laws during the 1980s included cities—Seattle, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, 
Chicago, Rochester—and states, including New Mexico, New York, and 
Massachusetts.
45
 
C. . . . And Its Contemporary Version 
Dissipating at the same pace as the political turmoil in Central 
America, the sanctuary movement regained momentum in the wake of the 
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
46
  A few months 
                                                     
40. Villarruel, supra note 35, at 1433; see also Feeley, supra note 22, at 820. 
41. Davidson, supra note 22, at 603. 
42. Villazor, supra note 39, at 141. 
43. Jennifer L. Gregorin, Comment, Hidden Beneath the Waves of 
Immigration Debate:  San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 175, 182 
(2011). 
44. Villazor, supra note 39, at 142 (affirming that laws were indicative of 
political stands against federal immigration policies regarding the Central American crisis); 
Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?  Local Sovereignty and the Federal 
Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006) (stating that local governments 
passed sanctuary laws allowing asylum-seekers to remain within their jurisdictions’ 
boundaries without threat of arrest for violation of federal immigration laws by local law 
enforcement). 
45. Pham, supra note 44, at 1383; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and 
State Sanctuary Declarations:  Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 
297, 311–12 n.88–97 (1989) (describing the extended implementation of sanctuary policies 
across the country and listing, among others, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and 
Sacramento, California; Rochester and Ithaca, New York; and Cambridge, Massachusetts as 
municipalities which also passed resolutions or city ordinances in favor of sanctuaries); Daniel 
D. McMillan, Note, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine:  Much Ado 
About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (1987) (affirming that the cities of 
Berkeley, California, and Madison, Wisconsin, also passed resolutions establishing 
themselves as “cities of refuge for Central American refugees”). 
46. Laura Sullivan, Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement:  Countering the 
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National 
Crime Information Center Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 572 (2009). 
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after the attack, answering concerns of the general public regarding national 
security and immigration, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a 
memorandum announcing the inherent authority of local officials to arrest 
and detain illegal immigrants for both civil immigration and criminal 
violations.
47
  Disapproving the policies set forth by the memorandum, local 
enforcement authorities adopted new sanctuary policies.
48
  The trend of 
implementing favorable sanctuary policies has grown steadily since then, 
albeit the heinous crime committed against innocent civilians in New York 
on September 11, 2001 would have warranted otherwise.
49
  By 2008, many 
states throughout the country counted sanctuary jurisdictions within their 
territorial boundaries.
50
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) responded to local 
jurisdictions’ implementation of sanctuary policies by creating “Secure 
Communities, [a program requiring] local law enforcement agencies to run 
fingerprints through the DHS illegal immigrant database upon booking.”51  
When a match occurred, ICE would be alerted and a detainer would be 
issued.
52
  DHS discontinued the program in 2014 due to complications in its 
administration arising out of lawsuits for violation of arrestees’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.
53
  DHS substituted Secure Communities with the Priority 
Enforcement Program (“PEP”), a program designed to limit the applicability 
                                                     
47. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, on Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to 
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 35 (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
48. Sullivan, supra note 46, at 573; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws 
in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2004). 
49. Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to 
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Kris W. Kobach, The 
Quintessential Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration 
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005).  Four different members of the terrorist commando 
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mohammed 
Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah—had previously violated federal immigration laws, but 
state or local law enforcement failed to detain them.  Kobach, supra at 184–87. 
50. See Gregorin, supra note 43, at 183; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–7, 9 (2008). 
51. See Bridget Stubblefield, Note, Development in the Executive Branch 
Sanctuary Cities:  Balancing Between National Security Directives, Local Law Enforcement 
Autonomy, and Immigrants’ Rights, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 542 (2015); Secure 
Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last 
updated May 19, 2017). 
52. Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543; see also Barbara E. Armacost, 
“Sanctuary” Laws:  The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1209 
(2016). 
53. See Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543. 
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of detainers merely to illegal immigrants convicted of a civil immigration 
priority offense[].
54
 
The implementation of federal immigration detention mandated by 
ICE did not produce the results hoped for, leading cities across the country to 
once again implement counter-policies in opposition to the federal 
immigration regulations.
55
  Currently, approximately 400 local 
jurisdictions—with New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles once again 
at the forefront of the movement—refuse to comply with federal immigration 
mandates and, either officially or unofficially, refuse to apply sanctuary 
regulations within their territories.
56
 
Modern sanctuaries do not conceal undocumented aliens nor shelter 
them from detection.
57
  “[W]hen a city says that it is being a sanctuary, it 
means that the city will not be an arm of federal immigration authorities.”58  
The lack of intent to physically protect individuals from law enforcement is 
what specifically separates modern sanctuaries from the original 
movement.
59
  In an interview released to Politico, the director of special 
projects at the New York Immigration Coalition contended that “the term 
sanctuary cities is a misnomer.”60  Shifting substantially from their historical 
meaning, nowadays sanctuary jurisdictions are considered to be cities, 
counties, or states, which limit government employees—specifically local 
law enforcement—from inquiring about the immigration status of 
immigrants they encounter; with an exception recognized for cases of serious 
criminal offense[s].
61
 
                                                     
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 542–43. 
56. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, City & Cty. of 
S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
2017, at 60, 60; Liz Robbins, Angry Mayors Vow to Defy Trump Immigration Order, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at A.17; Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary 
Cities, USA, OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017). 
57. Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60. 
58. Id. 
59. See id.; Villazor, supra note 39, at 148–49. 
60. Gloria Pazmino et al., Few Guarantees as Local Governments Plot 
‘Sanctuary’ Policy, POLITICO: CAL. (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:16 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2017/03/with-sanctuary-cities-in-trumps-
crosshairs-local-governments-craft-a-response-110692. 
“For people that are anti-immigrant, sanctuary cities are places where anyone can 
come and commit a crime and there is no law and order, and we know that is 
fiction” . . . .  “At the same time, sanctuary cities are not places where we can stop 
the federal government from entering and using information they have access to. 
Id. 
61. Corrie Bilke, Note, Divided We Stand, United We Fall:  A Public Policy 
Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165, 
9
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Although scholars and local policymakers have traditionally divided 
modern sanctuary policies into three major categories, such categories are 
often times combined by jurisdictions within one regulation.
62
  The first 
category, the so-called don’t ask policies, limits inquiries as to the nationality 
or immigration status of an individual by local law enforcement.
63
  The 
second category, don’t enforce policies, creates limitations on the power of 
local law enforcement to arrest or detain violators of immigration laws.
64
  
Don’t tell regulations, the third category, establishes limitations on the 
authority by local enforcement agents to report immigration status 
information to federal agencies.
65
 
States and municipalities, as well as individual police departments, 
have adopted diverse mechanisms to ensure that unauthorized aliens in their 
jurisdictions are not turned over to federal immigration authorities.
66
  For 
instance, Cook County, Illinois, home to Chicago, instructs its county jail 
system to deny compliance with ICE detainer requests;
67
 Los Angeles’ 
Special Order 40, the oldest city sanctuary ordinance, refrains police action 
for the mere purpose of determining a person’s immigration status;68 and San 
                                                                                                                             
180 (2009) (discussing the historical development of sanctuary cities in the United States and 
the potential hazards that nonfederal enforcement of immigration law that sanctuary cities 
seek to avert); Villazor, supra note 39, at 147–48 (examining the narrower scope of the 
definition of sanctuary cities compared to its original meaning). 
62. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; see also Sullivan, supra note 46, at 574. 
63. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
64. Id.; see also Pham, supra note 44, at 1390 (dividing don’t enforce 
provisions between “[n]o [e]nforcement of [i]mmigration [l]aws”—often reducing the 
resources available to officers to enforce federal immigration laws—and “[n]o [e]nforcement 
of [c]ivil [i]mmigration [l]aws”—barring cooperation in immigration law enforcement when 
the alleged violation is exclusively a civil violation). 
65. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
66. LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING 
IMMIGRATION LAW:  THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006). 
67. See Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities:  Chicago, NYC, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017, 7:27 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-san-
francisco-philadelphia/article/2629466. 
68. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40, UNDOCUMENTED 
ALIENS (1979); Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1469.  Los Angeles was one of the first cities in the 
United States to promote sanctuary policies.  Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.  The Office of the 
Los Angeles Chief of Police promulgated Special Order 40 to stop local enforcement agents 
from initiating police action with the sole purpose of discovering the immigration status of a 
person.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, supra.  The Order, however, allowed officers to 
communicate to federal agencies arrest records when the person arrested had been previously 
convicted of a felony.  Id. 
10
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Francisco Sheriff’s Department’s policy is that, absent a court issued warrant 
or signed order, contact with ICE representatives should be limited.
69
 
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE 
Since officially entering the presidential race in June of 2015, 
President Trump focused his campaign leitmotif on issues of public safety 
and threats presented by illegal immigration.
70
  On several occasions during 
his campaign, President Trump vowed to crack down on sanctuary 
jurisdictions in an attempt to lower criminal rates and defeat criminal 
organizations operating in the United States.
71
  Highly critical of the federal 
immigration policies implemented by former President Barack H. Obama—
his predecessor at the presidential helm—President Trump identified 
sanctuary policies as one of the main causes of the proliferation of criminal 
organizations.
72
  Since his election, as the forty-fifth President of the United 
States on November 8, 2016, President Trump’s position on immigration has 
not changed.
73
  Faithful to his campaign promises to the electorate, on 
January 25, 2017, exactly five days after taking the Oath of Office, President 
Trump signed the Executive Order.
74
 
                                                     
69. Letter from Ross Mirkarimi, Sheriff, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to All 
Personnel, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file with San Francisco Sheriff’s 
Department). 
70. Jason Le Miere, Immigrants Are Not ‘Criminals, Drug Dealers and 
Rapists,’ ICE Director Says, Contradicting Trump, NEWSWEEK: U.S. EDITION (June 28, 2017, 
4:42 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/immigrants-mexico-rapists-ice-immigration-629866. 
71. Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants to Do 
in His First 100 Days, NPR: POL. (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-his-
first-100-days. 
72. Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?, 
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-
cities-donald-trump/; see also Jose A. DelReal, Trump Blames Obama for Orlando Shooting, 
Blasts Clinton on Immigration, WASH. POST: POST POL. (June 13, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/13/trump-blames-obama-for-
orlando-shooting-blasts-clinton-on-immigration/. 
73. Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-down-
sanctuary-city/514427/; see also Dan Brekke, Trump:  California ‘Out of Control’ and 
Defunding Could Be in Store, KQED NEWS: CAL. REP. (Feb. 6, 2017, 11:50 AM), 
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/02/06/trump-california-out-of-control-and-defunding-could-
be-in-store/; Kelly & Sprunt, supra note 71.  In his interview with Bill O’Reilly, President 
Trump stated that defunding sanctuary cities would certainly be a weapon in the hands of the 
federal government to ensure compliance with federal directives.  Brekke, supra. 
74. Alvarez, supra note 73. 
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A. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States 
Composed of eighteen sections, the Executive Order lays out the 
presidential plan against illegal immigration.
75
  Specified in section one, 
“[t]he purpose of [the Executive Order] is to direct executive departments 
and agencies . . . to employ all lawful means to enforce immigration laws of 
the United States.”76  Further, affirming that aliens illegally entering the 
United States—and those aliens overstaying their visas—are a significant 
threat to both public safety and national security, the Executive Order asserts 
that faithful execution of federal immigration laws is impossible when 
exemptions apply to different classes and categories of removable aliens.
77
  
In a direct attack on sanctuary jurisdictions, section one also stresses that 
“[s]anctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate [f]ederal 
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.  
These jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people 
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”78 
In an additional effort to equalize the categories of removable aliens, 
section five of the Executive Order lists multiple classes of aliens that fulfill 
the federal requirements for removal.
79
  In its language, the Executive Order 
allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize for removal, in 
addition to those recognized by congressional acts, aliens who: 
 
a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense; 
b) Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such 
charge has not been resolved; 
c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal 
offense; 
d) Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in 
connection with any official matter or application before a 
governmental agency; 
e) Have abused any program related to receipt of public 
benefits; 
f) Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not 
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or 
g) In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose 
a risk to public safety or national security.
80
 
 
                                                     
75. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799–803 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
76. Id. at 8799. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 8800. 
80. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8800. 
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In order to implement the policies laid out in the Executive Order, in 
section eight, President Trump states that it is the intent of the Executive 
Branch to empower law enforcement agencies at both the state and local 
level to perform those functions generally employed by federal immigration 
officers.
81
  Attempting to foster cooperation between federal, state, and local 
agencies, the Executive Order further provides that the Secretary of State has 
the authority to enter into statutorily regulated agreements with state 
governors and local officials to permit local agencies to enforce federal 
laws.
82
  However, in opposition to the constructive language of section eight, 
the Executive Order provides punitive language in section nine for those 
jurisdictions that fail to enforce federal immigration policies.
83
 
B. Section Nine—The Source of Discord 
Section nine of the Executive Order is titled Sanctuary Jurisdictions, 
and affirms that “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to ensure, to 
the fullest extent of the law, that a [s]tate, or a political subdivision of a 
[s]tate, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”84  Specifically, subsection 9(a) 
establishes that: 
 In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the 
Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, 
shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 
U.S.C. § 1373—sanctuary jurisdictions—are not eligible to receive 
[f]ederal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement 
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.  The Secretary 
has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent 
consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction.  The 
Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against 
any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373, or which has in effect a 
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement 
of [f]ederal law.
85
 
The stated goal of section 9(a) of the Executive Order is to take 
enforcement actions against any entity or jurisdiction that fails to comply 
                                                     
81. Id. 
82. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012).  In 8 U.S.C § 1357(g), this section 
allows agreements between federal agencies and state or local agencies within the scope to 
permit local law enforcement to enforce federal laws and regulations.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)–
(2). 
83. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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with federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
86
  Stated within the language 
of section 9(a), and also confirmed by the language of section two, President 
Trump’s objective is to ensure that jurisdictions not in compliance with 
federal law do not receive federal funds and grants, with exceptions made for 
disbursements mandated by law.
87
 
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 
Signed into law by President Bill Clinton in September of 1996—
just a few months after another statute with similar language, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), 
was signed into law—the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) contained the provision which was later 
codified at Title 8 § 1373 of the United States Code.
88
  8 U.S.C. § 1373 
regulates communications between government agencies, including federal, 
state, and local agencies, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”).89  Specifically, the statute prohibits any federal, state, or local 
government entity or official from restricting “any government entity or 
official[s] from sending to, or receiving from, the [INS] information 
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any 
individual.”90  The statutory language further prohibits any person or agency 
                                                     
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 8799, 8801. 
88. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM & IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 
1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 180 (1996) (Conf. Rep); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration 
Sanctuary Policies:  Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public 
Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 263–64, 294 (2012) (affirming the similarities between the 
provision of the IIRIRA and the language of the PRWORA, better known as the Welfare 
Reform Act, signed into law by President Clinton just a few weeks before the IIRIRA in 
August 1996.  Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644, the Welfare Reform Act contained a provision 
regulating communications between state and local government and federal governmental 
agencies in a manner similar to the IIRIRA).  8 U.S.C. § 1644 provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local law, 
no [s]tate or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, 
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the 
United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012). 
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
90. Id. § 1373(a).  The Senate version of the bill noted in its report that the 
section: 
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between the 
[INS] and any [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local agency regarding a person’s immigration 
status. . . .  The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related 
information by [s]tate and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of 
considerable assistance to, the [f]ederal regulation of immigration and the achieving 
of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
14
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to “prohibit, or in any way restrict a [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local government 
entity from” sending, requesting, or receiving information regarding the 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual from the INS; 
maintaining such information; and exchanging information with other 
government agencies.
91
  Although prohibiting restrictions on information-
sharing between state and federal agencies, neither of these anti-sanctuary 
statutes renders cooperation with federal immigration authorities—or sharing 
of information—mandatory.92  As some scholars have noted, the 
characteristic of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is to encourage cooperation among 
different levels of law enforcement by prohibiting certain conduct instead of 
directly requiring local cooperation.
93
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES 
The reaction from states and municipalities, to the signing of the 
Executive Order, was strong and immediate.
94
  On January 31, 2017, the City 
and County of San Francisco filed a suit in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the 
Executive Order.
95
  The County of Santa Clara, California filed suit shortly 
thereafter on February 3, 2017, on similar grounds, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against all named defendants, which included President 
Trump himself.
96
  The City of Richmond, California also filed suit 
challenging the Executive Order on March 21, 2017, and on March 23, 2017, 
moved to relate its case to the suits brought by the Counties of Santa Clara 
and San Francisco.
97
  An additional action seeking declaratory and injunctive 
                                                                                                                             
Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law:  A Failed Approach to Immigration 
Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 177 
(2016) (quoting IMMIGRATION CONTROL & FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996, S. Rep. 
No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996)). 
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1996). 
92. See McCormick, supra note 90, at 169. 
93. Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 
UMKC L. REV. 901, 911 (2011).  The statute is enforceable exclusively against so-called 
don’t tell policies, while it is silent on the other two major categories of sanctuary policies, 
don’t enforce and don’t ask.  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
94. See Michelle Mark, ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Are Ready to Fight Trump’s 
Potentially ‘Unconstitutional’ Executive Order, BUS. INSIDER: POLITICS (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:09 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-trumps-executive-order-on-
immigration-2017-1. 
95. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 1–2. 
96. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, 4041, Cty. of 
Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017). 
97. Administrative Motion of City of Richmond to Consider Whether Cases 
Should Be Related Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12(B) & Notice of Related Case Pursuant to Civil 
15
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relief was filed on February 8, 2017, by the City of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, and the City of Chelsea, Massachusetts, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
98
  The counties and cities 
specifically challenged section 9(a), the enforcement provision within the 
language of the Executive Order, on several grounds.
99
 
In general, the cities and counties each argue that section 9(a) of the 
Executive Order violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine by improperly 
seeking to exercise congressional spending powers.
100
  In addition, even if 
President Trump could exercise such spending powers, the cities and 
counties contend that the Executive Order would be in violation of those 
powers—and thereby unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment—and, 
lastly, that section 9(a) violates the anti-commandeering clause of the Tenth 
Amendment.
101
 
On the other hand, support for the Executive Order—and the policies 
and objectives stated therein—has come from Patrick Morrissey, the 
Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jeff Landry, the Attorney General of 
Louisiana.
102
  In their amici curiae brief—filed in the action brought by the 
                                                                                                                             
Local Rule 3-13 at 12, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. 
filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Administrative Motion]; see also Complaint for Injunctive & 
Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order 13768 at 3, 29, City of Richmond v. 
Trump, 2017 WL 3605216 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535-WHO).  Cty. of 
Santa Clara v. Trump and City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump had already been consolidated in 
February pursuant to an order issued by Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the 
Northern District of California.  See Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & 
County of San Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768 at 29, 
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017). 
98. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 2. 
99. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 15; Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Sues Trump over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Order, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2017, at A11; Maura Dolan & James Queally, Santa Clara County Seeks to Block 
Trump’s Order to Defund Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clara-sanctuary-trump-lawsuit-20170223-
story.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); Alison 
Frankel, Cities Say Trump’s Sanctuary Policy Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017, 
5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-sanctuary-idUSKBN171361. 
100. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 1622; Frankel, supra note 99; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
101. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 16; see also Frankel, supra note 99; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
102. See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Louisiana, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, & Texas at 1, 12, 
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) 
[hereinafter Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae].  The Amici states supporting the Executive 
Order also include the states of “Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Texas.”  Id. at 1 n.1. 
16
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City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara—both 
maintain that the Executive Order is constitutional and challenges the 
validity of the action taken by these cities and counties based upon 
justiciability grounds.
103
  Without going into the specific merits of whether 
any of the plaintiffs have standing to bring the action, the following analysis 
will focus on the constitutionality of the Executive Order, including possible 
arguments in favor or against it.
104
 
A. Spending Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes what 
has been defined as the Taxing and Spending Clause.
105
  The Taxing and 
Spending Clause textually affirms that “Congress shall have the Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.”106 
Vast jurisprudence has interpreted the language of the Taxing and 
Spending Clause, starting with United States v. Butler,
107
 which defines the 
federal spending power broadly to promote the general welfare.
108
  The 
                                                     
103. Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 2.  The first argument 
presented by the brief is the lack of standing to bring suit due to the absence of any injury to 
the jurisdictions.  Id. 
104. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799; Proposed Brief of 
Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 3; State of California’s Administrative Motion for Leave to 
File an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter State of California’s Administrative Motion]. 
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
106. Id.; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the 
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111–12 (1987).  The Founding Fathers disagreed on the 
extent of the General Welfare Clause, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
expressing ideas at the opposite end of the spectrum.  Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 
178 (Alexander Hamilton) (American Bar Association ed., 2009), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 
41, at 233–34 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 2009).  Alexander Hamilton 
thought that additional power was provided by the General Welfare Clause to Congress 
without limits imposed by other enumerated powers.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra.  
Contrarily, James Madison interpreted the General Welfare Clause as confining Congress’ 
taxing and spending powers to those fields enumerated by the Constitution.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra at 233–34. 
107. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
108. Id. at 65–66.  “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public 
money[] for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in 
the Constitution.”  Id. at 66 (adopting Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of the General 
Welfare Clause); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 106, at 177–78 (Alexander 
Hamilton); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause?  (or the President’s Paramour):  An 
17
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Supreme Court of the United States further affirmed in South Dakota v. 
Dole
109
 that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, 
and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient 
with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”110  Articulating 
limitations to the applicable conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced 
in Dole a four-part test stemming from previous, singular rulings of the 
Court.
111
  First, the use of spending power by Congress must be in 
furtherance of the general welfare.
112
  Reaffirming the principle established 
in Helvering v. Davis,
113
 the Chief Justice recognized that courts should 
observe some degree of deference to Congress in determining “whether a 
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.”114  
Second, conditions imposed by Congress on grants must be unambiguous.
115
  
Third, there must be a relation between the conditions imposed by Congress 
                                                                                                                             
Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of 
the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103 (1999). 
109. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
110. Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).  
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158, a federal 
statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold otherwise allocable funds from 
states in which the drinking age was legally below twenty-one years.  Id. at 205.  The United 
States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the complaint, and the ruling 
was later confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding the statute to be a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’ spending power.  Id. at 212.  “Congress can trade things within its power—like 
money, or regulatory authority, or forbearance from preemption—for state assistance that 
would otherwise lie beyond its reach.”  Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal:  Immigration 
Enforcement and the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 120 (2016). 
111. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 91 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
155, 166 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297 
U.S. at 65). 
113. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
114. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.  Changing the terms of an existing funding 
agreement would be a breach similar in nature to changing the terms of an existing contract.  
Andrew Hanson, “Economic Dragooning”:  Limiting Trump’s Ability to Punish Sanctuary 
Cities, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.harvardlpr.com/2016/12/01/economic-dragooning-limiting-trumps-ability-to-
punish-sanctuary-cities/. 
115. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
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and the purpose of the federal program—a limitation of germaneness.116  
Fourth, congressional intent in establishing the program cannot constitute a 
violation of other specific restrictions imposed on the federal government by 
the Constitution.
117
  Chief Justice Rehnquist also interestingly affirmed near 
the end of the opinion “that in some circumstances the financial inducement 
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”118  Although no compulsion was found in 
Dole, the opinion created a new threshold for congressional legislative acts 
to be deemed constitutional—opening the gates to additional challenges.119  
Although not all parts of the four-part test are allegedly challenged by the 
language of the Executive Order, arguments can be made as to at least three 
parts.
120
 
1. Clarity of Intent 
In the specific words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, when “Congress 
desires to condition the [s]tates’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so 
unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the [s]tates to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”121  The 
contractual nature of the Taxing and Spending Clause enables jurisdictions to 
know the requirements and expectations set forth by Congress before 
accepting their end of the bargain.
122
  Thus, it is counter-intuitive that 
Congress’ legitimate use of its spending power depend on whether 
acceptance of conditions on funds by local jurisdictions is made 
                                                     
116. Craig Eichstadt, Twenty-Year Legacy of South Dakota v. Dole, 52 S.D. L. 
REV. 458, 458 (2007); accord Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
117. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.  Language in previous rulings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States uncontrovertibly affirms the “proposition that the [spending] power 
may not be used to induce the [s]tates to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 210. 
118. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937)). 
119. See id. at 211–12; e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2604 (2012). 
120. See Eddie Nasser, President Trump Overstepped His Authority on 
Sanctuary Cities, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/28/president-trump-overstepped-his-authority-on-sanctuary-
cities/. 
121. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2000)). 
122. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17. 
19
Macelloni: A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powe
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
114 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
voluntarily.
123
  Voluntary and knowing acceptance of federal funds implies 
that no implementation of after-the-fact conditions are permitted.
124
  In fact, 
“[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it 
does not include surprising participating [s]tates with post-acceptance or 
retroactive conditions.”125  The Court in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius
126
 clearly states that Congress is not free to penalize 
States for their choice to not participate in new programs by taking away 
existing funding—a decision that resembles less of a constitutional use of 
spending powers, and more of an abuse of it.
127
 
The jurisdictions challenging the Executive Order affirmed that the 
main purpose of the Executive Order is to retroactively condition all federal 
grants to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
128
  Doubting the clarity of the 
Executive Order, the cities and counties bringing the action claimed that the 
conditions, being inexistent at the time federal grants were accepted, could 
not be accepted knowingly and willingly—as is required by the Dole test—
thus creating forcible conditions on federal grants in violation of the 
Constitution.
129
  These jurisdictions further contended that the ambiguity of 
the Executive Order extends to the exact nature of the grants being 
conditioned.
130
  If the Executive Order applies conditions on federal grants, 
both the nature of the grants and the amount of federal funds being 
conditioned need to be stated clearly, thus allowing the voluntary choice by 
States and municipalities to either accept or reject the federal grants.
131
 
Additionally, the ambiguity of the Executive Order extends to the 
conduct being specifically targeted.
132
  If no clear directions are given by the 
federal government on whether a certain conduct would fall under the 
umbrella of conduct that the Executive Order is trying to limit, then it 
becomes nearly impossible for jurisdictions to avoid penalties through policy 
adjustments.
133
 
                                                     
123. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
124. Id. at 2606. 
125. Id. 
126. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
127. See id. at 2607. 
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
129. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Complaint for 
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
130. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
131. Cf. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
132. See Eric Levenson, Seattle Challenges Trump over Executive Order on 
‘Sanctuary Cities’, CNN: POL. (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/seattle-lawsuit-trump-sanctuary-city/index.html. 
133. See Frankel, supra note 99; cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28 
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On the other hand, although refraining from discussion about 
whether any existing grant program meets the Dole criteria—compliance 
strongly denied by those jurisdictions bringing the lawsuit—the states in 
support of the Executive Order confirm the validity of the Executive 
Order.
134
  According to the filed Amici Brief, an authorization by Congress 
allowing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to administer grant 
programs, conditioning receipt on compliance with specific federal 
immigration laws, is well within constitutional boundaries.
135
  A 
memorandum issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions also helps further 
clarify the essence of federal grants potentially conditioned on compliance 
with federal immigration laws, thereby rendering meritless the claims of 
ambiguity with regard to the nature of the grants.
136
  The memorandum 
affirms that “section 9(a) of the Executive Order . . . will be applied solely to 
federal grants administered by the [DOJ] or the [DHS], and not to other 
sources of federal funding.”137  However, the memorandum arguably fails 
one of its main objectives—specifying the conduct leading to denial of 
federal funds.
138
  Although limiting the term sanctuary jurisdiction to those 
jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373,” the 
memorandum fails to clarify the characteristics of a willful refusal, leaving 
states and localities in the dark as to the exactitude of the targeted conduct.
139
 
2. Nexus Requirement 
As a third requirement to achieve constitutionality, Dole affirmed 
that a connection must exist between the condition applied to federal grants 
and the government interest to be achieved.
140
  The Dole Court stated that 
“conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to 
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”141  What has 
                                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000). 
134. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 
102, at 1–2. 
135. See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 8. 
136. See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Office of the 
Attorney Gen. on Implementation of Executive Order 13768, to All Department Grant-
Making Components 1–2 (May 22, 2017) (on file with Office of the Attorney Gen.). 
137. Id. (emphasis added); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 
8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
138. See Priscilla Alvarez, Sessions’s Climbdown on Sanctuary Cities, 
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessionss-
climbdown-on-sanctuary-cities/527844/. 
139. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
140. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
141. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). 
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been recognized as the nexus requirement under the Dole test is only 
established when a reasonable relationship between the condition applied by 
Congress and the purpose of the federal program exists.
142
 
Thus, a connection must exist between the federal funds being 
conditioned by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, and the 
ultimate goal of the Executive Order—compliance with § 1373 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code.
143
  The language of the Executive Order, in 
conjunction with the memorandum released by the Attorney General might, 
however, frustrate the Executive Order’s intentions.144  In fact, the Attorney 
General’s clarification on the identity of the federal grants that could 
potentially be affected in the process sheds some light on, but also clashes 
with, the express language of the Executive Order.
145
  The Executive Order 
alleges specifically the non-applicability of conditions on grants necessary 
for purposes of law enforcement.
146
  However, since all grants mentioned by 
the Attorney General as possible targets are, on different levels, designed for 
law enforcement purposes, it becomes unclear what other grants could be 
affected.
147
  The issue is of major relevance, because conditions on grants 
unrelated to immigration purposes—thus running afoul of the concept of 
germaneness—would be the exact type of federal activity the Dole Court 
intended to eliminate.
148
 
3. Coercion 
While not an integral part of the four-prong test developed in Dole, 
the anti-coercion requirement is not any less important in establishing 
whether conditions on federal grants are constitutional.
149
  Nevertheless, 
although—as noted above—courts recognize that financial inducement 
                                                     
142. See id. at 213.  “I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on 
the spending power:  [T]he expenditure must be for the general welfare, . . . the conditions 
imposed must be unambiguous, . . . they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the 
expenditure, . . . and the legislation may not violate any independent constitutional prohibition 
. . . .”  Id. (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Letter from Annie Lai, 
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law et al., to Donald J. Trump, 
President of the United States of America 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (on file with the Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center). 
144. See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99. 
145. See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99. 
146. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
147. See id.; Vivian Yee & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Narrows Order Against 
Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017, at A18. 
148. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
149. See id. at 207–08, 211. 
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offered by Congress can be over-coercive, congressional threats to withhold 
money are upheld when they affect a limited amount of funds.
150
 
In Dole, the Supreme Court found the threat of losing 5% of 
highway funds was not impermissibly coercive, and the financial inducement 
a “relatively mild encouragement to . . . [s]tates” to implement the language 
of the statute.
151
  In similar scenarios, states have the faculty to decide 
whether to accept the condition applied by Congress or deny acceptance of 
the grant.
152
  As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
153
 courts “look to the [s]tates 
to defend [its] prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not 
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the 
federal policies as their own.”154  When conditions attached to federal funds 
resemble a gun to the head, congressional encouragement to state action is 
not considered a valid exercise of spending powers.
155
  If States are not 
allowed to practically exercise a choice between acceptance or denial of 
conditions, but can only theoretically preserve such power, congressional 
actions appear as economic dragooning and are therefore unconstitutional.
156
 
The threat of coercion varies based on the jurisdiction and their 
degree of reliance on federal funding for the daily management of duties and 
services to the resident population.
157
  Among the jurisdictions directly 
involved in opposing the Executive Order, San Francisco’s yearly budget 
gravitates around $10 billion, with approximately $1.2 billion coming 
directly from the federal government.
158
  Santa Clara’s federal funding for 
the 2015 to 2016 fiscal year was approximately $1 billion, a staggering 15% 
                                                     
150. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); 
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
151. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
152. Id. at 211–12. 
153. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012). 
154. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).  Being 
separate and independent sovereigns, states need to act like it by demonstrating their will.  Id. 
155. Id. at 2604–05. 
156. Id. at 2605; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60; Hanson, supra 
note 114. 
157. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.  “When we consider . . 
. that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable 
minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specifi[c] highway grant 
programs, the argument as to coercion is . . . more rhetoric than fact.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
158. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 16; see 
CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MAYOR’S OFFICE OF PUB. POLICY & FIN., MAYOR’S 2017–2018 & 2018–
2019 PROPOSED BUDGET 11 (2017), 
http://www.sfmayor.org/sites/default/files/CSF_Budget_Book_2017_Final_CMYK_LowRes.
pdf. 
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of the county’s total budget.159  Further, Chicago received $1.08 billion in 
federal funding in 2015, with an estimated increase to $1.25 billion for 
2016—roughly 13.5% of the yearly city’s budget.160 
The outcome of a coercion analysis regarding whether the Executive 
Order represents a coercive exercise of federal spending powers depends on 
the exact federal grants that would be withheld in case of non-compliance 
with the statute by a state or local jurisdiction.
161
  Therefore, a coercive effect 
would likely be an inevitable outcome if more than just federal funds for 
policing were affected.
162
  Contrarily, it is likely that Courts would rule in 
accordance with Dole and uphold the conditions on federal grants.
163
 
B. Tenth Amendment Umbrella 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution affirms that “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”164  In an 
effort to shape the relationship between the federal and state governments, 
the language of the Tenth Amendment helps define the concept of 
federalism.
165
  The basic principle established by the Tenth Amendment is 
that if powers are “delegated to Congress [by] the Constitution, [then] the 
Tenth Amendment . . . [refutes] any reservation of that [specific] power to 
the [s]tates.”166  Nevertheless, when a power is “not delegated to [Congress] 
by the Constitution,” it belongs to the [s]tates.167 
                                                     
159. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 7. 
160. See CITY OF CHICAGO, 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW 34 (2016), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2016Budget/2016Budget
OverviewCoC.pdf [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW]. 
161. See Cities Under Siege, ECONOMIST (London), May 6, 2017, at 36.  For 
example, Chicago would only lose $2 million if “the order would affect only federal funds for 
policing” as argued by the Attorney General in his memorandum.  Id.  However, if more 
federal grants will be affected, Chicago would lose, according to some estimates, up to $3.6 
billion for the current year.  Id. 
162. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
163. See id. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
165. See id. 
166. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
167. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (emphasis added).  
“It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which has 
not been surrendered.’”  New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124). 
24
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1. Anti-Commandeering 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ understanding and 
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has been that “[t]he States 
unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to 
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers 
and transferred those powers to the federal government.”168 
[T]he preservation of the [s]tates, and the maintenance of their 
governments, are as much within the design and care of the 
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance 
of the National [G]overnment.  The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible [s]tates.
169
 
New York v. United States,
170
 solidified the principle of anti-
commandeering.
171
  The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
Congress does not have the power to “commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the [s]tates by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”172  Upheld in Printz v. United States,173 the 
prohibition extends to federal directives requiring particular problems to be 
addressed, and to orders given to states’ officers to administer and enforce 
any federal regulatory program.
174
  Prohibition to compel states to enact and 
                                                     
168. New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (noting that the structure of the Constitution reveals the system of dual 
sovereignty as a controlling principle). 
169. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868). 
170. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
171. Id. at 145, 202 (White, J., concurring).  The language of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 specified that a state or regional compact 
failing to provide disposal of internally generated waste by a particular date must take title and 
possession of the waste.  Id. at 153–54 (majority opinion).  The provision also directed States 
to assume liability for internally generated waste if they failed to comply.  Id.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor found the provision impermissibly coercive, and thus, 
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.  Id. at 176, 188. 
172. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (affirming that the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 was constitutional for the exact reason that it did not commandeer 
the States into regulating mining)). 
173. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
174. Id. at 935.  The Supreme Court held the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1968, which required the Attorney General to establish a national system 
for instant background checking of prospective handgun purchasers and to command the chief 
law enforcement officers nationwide to conduct checks and related police tasks, 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 933–34. 
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administer federal programs applies regardless of whether congressional 
commands to regulate are pointed directly to states, or a state is coerced to 
implement a federal regulatory system.
175
  Notwithstanding the principles 
enunciated in both New York and Printz, support of state governments and 
officials is possible when national security is at stake, therefore authorizing 
an exception to anti-commandeering for reasons beyond the general control 
of the federal government.
176
 
The Executive Order arguably affects states and local jurisdictions in 
two ways:  First, compelling jurisdictions to comply with federal detainer 
requests in order to avoid being labeled as a sanctuary, thus losing 
funding;
177
 and second, preventing jurisdictions from exercising those police 
powers assigned to them under the Tenth Amendment.
178
 
a. ICE Detainers 
The language of section 9(b) of the Executive Order indicates that 
jurisdictions failing to comply with any ICE detainer request fall within the 
category of sanctuary jurisdictions.
179
  An ICE civil detainer consists of local 
law enforcement agencies requesting local jurisdictions to keep inmates held 
for actual or suspected violations of state criminal laws for up to forty-eight 
hours after the inmate’s scheduled release—potentially extending detention 
up to five days when arrests and custody stretch over a holiday weekend.
180
  
The detainers serve the purpose of giving ICE agents enough time to verify 
the information within federal databases and determine whether the 
individual should be taken into federal custody.
181
 
In its attempt to enforce ICE detainers, the language of the Executive 
Order—perceived as mandatory—runs afoul of constitutional principles 
established by judicial interpretation.
182
  In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of 
                                                     
175. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 
(2012). 
176. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 940; Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on ICE:  
State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1063, 
1073 (2006).  “Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a 
military draft . . . or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national 
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
177. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1. 
178. Id. 
179. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
180. Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 546–47. 
181. Id. at 545; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 306-112-002B, 
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 2, 4 (Mar. 24, 2017). 
182. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799.  But see Galarza v. 
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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Appeals in Galarza v. Szalczyk,
183
 affirmed that local governments are not 
under any duty to comply with ICE civil detainer requests, which are strictly 
voluntary.
184
  In fact, “settled constitutional law clearly establishes that 
[immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because, under the Tenth 
Amendment, any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional.
185
  
Ordering imprisonment of suspected aliens subject to removal would, in fact, 
be inconsistent with the essential principles of anti-commandeering.
186
  The 
constitutional violations resulting from mandated imprisonment are not 
limited to the Tenth Amendment, but often further extend to violations of the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
187
 
In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,
188
 the court found 
Clackamas County in violation of Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable seizures.
189
  Although the county argued that the 
seizure was a mere continuation of the original arrest, the court found 
otherwise.
190
  The “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment 
custody” by the county jail was not justified by the pending detainer request 
by ICE.
191
  A similar ruling was given by the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Morales v. Chadbourne,
192
 where the court found a twenty-four-
hour imprisonment pursuant to an ICE detainer a violation of the arrestee’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.
193
  The court stated that, absent a warrant, 
immigration officers have the faculty to arrest an alien “only if they have 
‘reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation 
                                                     
183. 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014). 
184. See id. at 643, 645. 
185. Id. at 643. 
186. Id. 
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 
3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1, 9, 11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).  A well-
established principle is that “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”  United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
188. No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). 
189. See id. at *11.  “Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a . . . 
restraining order and booked into the [county] [j]ail.”  Id. at *1.  According to its policy to 
report arrests of foreign-born persons “on a warrant or probable cause charge[s],” the jail 
notified ICE, and a detainer request was issued to the jail the following day.  Id.  In 
furtherance of ICE objectives, the jail also honors detainers “even if the underlying state 
criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted.”  Id. at *2.  Arrested on March 14, 2012, 
“Miranda-Olivares remained in custody . . . on . . . state charges until March 29, 2012,” but 
due to the ICE detainer, remained in custody until the following day, when picked up by DHS 
agents.  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2–3. 
190. Id. at *9. 
191. Id. 
192. 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015). 
193. See id. at 211, 218, 223. 
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of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a 
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.’”194  The court further affirmed that 
reason to believe must be effectively considered equal to probable cause for 
the arrest, and that arrests made in its absence are in violation of Fourth 
Amendment principles.
195
  The plethora of lawsuits and consequential 
liability for Fourth Amendment violations are some of the reasons why cities 
and counties across the United States enact policies restricting compliance 
with ICE detainers.
196
 
Given the extensive jurisprudence on the unconstitutionality of 
detainer requests, which often lead to prolonged arrest periods for aliens 
absent probable cause, it becomes difficult to not justify the decision of local 
jurisdictions to refuse compliance to ICE detainers, which is likely a mere 
exercise of constitutional police powers.
197
 
b. Police Powers 
The so-called police powers are the states’ reserved constitutional 
authority under the Tenth Amendment to promote health, safety, and welfare 
of their residents.
198
  In Sligh v. Kirkwood,
199
 the Supreme Court of the 
United States affirmed that: 
The police power, in its broadest sense, includes all legislation and 
almost every function of civil government.  It is not subject to 
definite limitations, but [it] is coextensive with the necessities of 
the case and the safeguards of public interest.  It embraces 
regulations designed to promote public convenience or the general 
prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to 
promote the public safety or the public health.
200
 
Sanctuary policies reflect determination by states and local 
jurisdiction to exercise their judgment and promote health and safety of their 
                                                     
194. Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(2) (2012)). 
195. Id. (citing Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 
721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 
196. See Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to 
Hold Noncitizens for Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, at A10. 
197. See Morales, 793 F.3d at 211–12; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., 
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Medina, supra 
note 196. 
198. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 
(1915). 
199. 237 U.S. 52 (1915). 
200. Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
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residents.
201
  It is undisputed that “[t]he promotion of safety of persons and 
property is . . . at the core of the [s]tate’s police power.”202  United States v. 
Morrison
203
 affirms the long recognized principle that states possess a unique 
domain of authority over many functions of government.
204
  In fact, the 
Founders “ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by 
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal 
bureaucracy.”205  Moreover, the choice to limit direct involvement in the 
enforcement of federal immigration policies is dictated by practical issues of 
community management, and is strongly supported by those charged with 
patrolling the community to ensure its safety.
206
  The Executive Order 
arguably infringes upon the discretion of local law enforcement authorities to 
make the policy judgments deemed necessary, replacing them with federal 
preferences.
207
  Law enforcement agencies throughout the country have 
shown support for sanctuary policies.
208
  Police chiefs and sheriffs, together 
with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, sustain that using local law 
                                                     
201. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1. 
202. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). 
203. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
204. Id. at 618. 
205. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 262 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 
2009)).  The issue of accountability is a fundamental factor in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 2592, 2602.  “Accountability is considered a particularly powerful 
argument against commandeering . . . .”  Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009); cf. New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (affirming that “where the federal government directs the [s]tates to 
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral 
ramifications of their decision[s].”). 
206. Pham, supra note 48, at 981. 
207. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fe. Reg. 8799, 8799-801 (Jan. 25, 2017); 
Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties-Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo 
Alto, Fremont, Marin, Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, 
Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 5, 10–11, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO 
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & 
Counties].  The argument is based on the Supreme Court’s assertion that the wide discretion 
given to the states to determine what is necessary—and what is not—must be respected.  East 
N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945). 
208. See Chuck Wexler, Police Chiefs Across the Country Support Sanctuary 
Cities Because They Keep Crime Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wexler-sanctuary-cities-immigration-crime-
20170306-story.html. 
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enforcement agents to further federal immigration laws would be a detriment 
to the safety of local communities.
209
 
Police apprehension towards local officers enforcing federal 
immigration laws is based upon multiple reasons.
210
  First, enforcement of 
immigration laws risks “[u]ndermin[ing] [the] [t]rust and [c]ooperation of 
[i]mmigrant [c]ommunities.”211  Studies have shown that a majority of chiefs 
and sheriffs—from both red and blue states—consider maintaining high 
levels of trust with the immigrant communities towards police officers a 
priority.
212
  If any sort of trust is lacking, a reasonable consequence to the 
legitimate fear for deportation, the process of community policing is halted, 
hindering the community.
213
  Second, “budgets and resources of local police 
agencies” are limited when compared to the economic power of the federal 
government—making the use of local officers to implement federal 
immigration laws financially burdensome for local communities.
214
  Third, 
federal immigration laws present complicated policies, both on the civil and 
criminal side of the law, and local agents are not necessarily fit to enforce 
them.
215
  Fourth, local police lack the degree of authority that federal agents 
can exercise when enforcing immigration laws, thus increasing the level of 
difficulty for local agents to discern whether a particular violation results in 
criminal charges or mere civil violations.
216
  Finally, participation of local 
police officers in the enforcement of immigration laws would possibly 
expose local agencies to civil litigation and liability.
217
  “By upending the 
independent judgment of local officials responsible for ‘the suppression of 
                                                     
209. See Tom Jawetz, Trump’s Deportation Rules Will Make America Unsafe 
Again, FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.fortune.com/2017/02/24/donald-trump-public-
safety-executive-order-deportation-immigration-illegal-undocumented/. 
210. See CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION 
COMM., M.C.C. NINE (9) POINT POSITION STATEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS 
BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5–8 (2006). 
211. Id. at 5. 
212. See id. at 5–6; Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Giving Sanctuary to 
Undocumented Immigrants Doesn’t Threaten Public Safety—It Increases It, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanctuary-cities-trump-
20170202-story.html. 
213. Amicus Brief of 34 Cities & Counties in Support of County of Santa 
Clara’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–8, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-
00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae 
California Cities & Counties—Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo Alto, Fremont, Marin, 
Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 
5, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties]. 
214. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., supra note 210, at 6. 
215. See id. at 7. 
216. See id. at 7–8. 
217. Id. at 8. 
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violent crime and vindication of its victims,’ . . . the Executive Order 
intrudes upon a power reserved for the states and local governments, and 
threatens to undermine the mission of local law enforcement.”218 
Data analysis hints to a different reality than the one claimed by 
President Trump, and police departments across the country seem to agree 
with it.
219
  The data evidences that sanctuary jurisdictions present a lower 
average criminality level when compared to comparably sized non-sanctuary 
jurisdictions.
220
  Although numerically not impressive, researchers point out 
results that are statistically important, like lower crime and homicide rates.
221
  
Generally, however, production of conflicting studies and interpretation of 
data render an objective analysis of the issue all but simple.
222
  Taking 
Phoenix, Arizona as an example, data shows that crime rates fell by 
impressive margins following the city renouncing its sanctuary status.
223
  A 
six-year study from the University of California, Riverside found levels of 
violent crimes to be “slightly higher in sanctuary cities.”224  Independent 
from the crime rates analysis, it is important to highlight that one of the main 
fears of pro-sanctuary police departments across the country—decrease in 
crime reports resulting from the distrust towards law enforcement and 
immigration agents in non-sanctuary jurisdictions—is legitimate.225  Crime 
reports in Latino communities throughout the United States are decreasing, 
thus making police officers’ investigating jobs harder while simultaneously 
increasing the amount of silent victims.
226
  Therefore, although conflicting 
data exists, it is indisputably within the interest, right, and power of local 
                                                     
218. Amicus Brief, supra note 213, at 8 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)). 
219. See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds of 
Crime.  Data Say the Opposite., CHI. TRIB.: NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-sanctuary-city-crime-data-
20170127-story.html. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See William Lajeunesse, Crime Drops in Phoenix After City Drops 
Sanctuary City Status, Former Cops Say, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 30, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/06/30/crime-drops-in-phoenix-after-city-drops-
sanctuary-city-status-former-cops-say.html. 
223. See id. 
224. Id. 
225. See James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a 
Climate of Fear in Immigrant Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES: LOCAL (Mar. 21, 2017, 
8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-crime-reporting-drops-
20170321-story.html. 
226. See id. 
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jurisdictions to foster participation of all members of the community when it 
comes to crime reporting and cooperation.
227
 
 
2. Are Sanctuary Policies Targeted by the Executive Order Preempted 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1373? 
 
As confirmed by the Attorney General, the intent of the Executive 
Order is to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1373 against jurisdictions deemed to be in 
violation of the language of the statute.
228
  However, it is not clear whether 
by implementing their policies, sanctuary jurisdictions are in violation of the 
statute, thus triggering federal preemption.
229
  The relationship between 
federal and state law in case of a conflict is regulated by the preemption 
doctrine, which provides the superiority of federal law over state law.
230
  A 
classical analysis of preemption principles generally considers whether the 
language of the “federal law expressly precludes state and local governments 
from passing such a law.”231  De Canas v. Bica232 developed a similar 
analysis to determine whether state or local policies are preempted.
233
  The 
three-prong analysis first considers “whether the law is attempting to 
regulate immigration;” second, whether it occupies “a field [generally] 
occupied by Congress;” and third, whether it is in conflict with federal 
law.
234
  The first and second prongs are easily discernible because they “are 
unique to immigration law.”235  It is a widely recognized principle that the 
power to regulate immigration matters is retained by the federal 
government.
236
  The third prong is based upon the Supremacy Clause.
237
 
                                                     
227. See Jawetz, supra note 209. 
228. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2; see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Maria Sacchetti & Sari Horwitz, Sessions Memo Defines 
Sanctuary Cities — and Hints That the Definition May Widen, WASH. POST: SOC. ISSUE (May 
22, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/sessions-memo-defines-
sanctuary-cities--and-hints-that-the-definition-may-widen/2017/05/22/68f8c9ec-3f1a-11e7-
9869-bac8b44829a_story. 
229. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2, 
2 n.7; Yee & Ruiz, supra note 147. 
230. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 
(1994). 
231. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & 
Immigration Federalism:  A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1698 (2009). 
232. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
233. See id. at 356–63; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699. 
234. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1698–99; see also De Canas, 
424 U.S. at 35463. 
235. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699. 
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  “The Congress shall have [the] [p]ower . . . 
[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”  Id. 
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The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 primarily targets only one of the 
three scholarly-developed categories of sanctuary policies namely the so-
called don’t tell policies.238  Summing up the language of the statute 
analyzed in Part II of this Comment, the statute “prohibits government 
entities, agencies, officials, and persons from preventing the voluntary 
reporting of a person’s immigration status by any governmental entity, 
officials, or employees to federal immigration authority.”239  Sanctuary 
policies have been enacted by jurisdictions throughout the country, however, 
did not include, for the most part, any language prohibiting communications 
between local and federal authorities.
240
  For example, Santa Clara 
authorities prohibit employees from using County resources to transmit any 
information to federal agencies that was collected while providing services to 
the community.
241
  Santa Clara further prohibits employees from initiating 
inquiries or enforcement actions based upon the actual or suspected 
immigration status of the individual, national origin, race, ethnicity, or 
English-speaking ability.
242
  Another example of a don’t ask policy is given 
by the City of Philadelphia, where police officers are required “not [to] ask 
about the documentation status of people they encounter,” although 
cooperation with federal agencies in “anti-terrorism and drug trafficking task 
forces” is encouraged.243  New Orleans also has similar policies.244  The New 
Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) forbids officers from initiating 
investigations or taking law enforcement actions due to immigration status, 
“including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, [or] arrest,” a policy 
                                                                                                                             
237. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 This Constitution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in 
[p]ursuance thereof; and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the [a]uthority of 
the United States shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every state shall 
be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
238. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700, 1704; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373 (1996). 
239. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700. 
240. See id. at 1692–93; CITY OF PHILA., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, IMMIGRATION 
& SANCTUARY CITIES:  CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ACTION GUIDE (2017), 
http://beta.phila.gov/posts/office-of-immigrant-affairs/2017-02-24-immigration-sanctuary-
cities-city-of-philadelphia-action-guide/. 
241. See Bd. of Supervisors of the Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010). 
242. Id.; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2015).  
Reasonable suspicion is required for police officers to stop individuals and inquire about 
“them regarding their immigration status.”  Morales, 793 F.3d at 215. 
243. CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
244. See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL CH. 41.6.1, 
IMMIGRATION STATUS 1 (2016). 
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fitting the parameters of so-called don’t enforce policies.245  The NOPD also 
explicitly states that the activities of police officers must be in compliance 
with the statutory requirements, and that communications between federal 
and local law enforcement agents are welcomed.
246
  Jurisdictions 
implementing don’t ask policies also respect judicial doctrines against brief 
stops—absent reasonable suspicion—of alien individuals for inquiries on the 
alien’s immigration status.247  Detention to inquire about an individual’s 
immigration status has in fact been ruled a seizure implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.
248
  Further, “no exception to the Tenth Amendment” permits 
federal mandates to the states to disclose private information of residents 
gathered by the exercise of sovereign capacity.
249
  The principle is embedded 
in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reno v. Condon,250 allowing federal 
requirements of information sharing only when not requiring states “to enact 
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”251 
Nothing within the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 can be read to 
preempt jurisdictions from prohibiting the use of local funds to help federal 
agencies in enforcing immigration laws.
252
  Further, the statute does not 
proscribe the implementation of policies designed to prevent police officers 
from proactively searching for information that would not be promptly or 
inevitably available to them.
253
  In fact, although an argument could be 
presented that the language of the statute impliedly preempts proscriptions of 
information-gathering activities by police officers, it appears that the statute 
was designed to foster communication between agencies of already available 
information.
254
  It is well established that: 
                                                     
245. Id.; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.  Multiple jurisdictions across the 
country implemented policies presenting the same characteristics.  Gulasekaram & Villazor, 
supra note 231, at 1694. 
246. See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, supra note 244, at 1, 3. 
247. CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; Pham, 
supra note 48, at 982. 
248. Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–17 (1984)). 
249. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 5; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
250. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
251. Id. at 151; Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 
143, at 5. 
252. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
253. See id. 
254. See id.; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703. 
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal 
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:  
[C]onflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; 
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.  But none 
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Congress, in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, opted not to require state 
and local governments to ask for an individual’s immigration 
status or mandate them to report such status to immigration 
officials.  Congress was well aware of the sanctuary movement 
when it passed this law yet it chose not to mandate the gathering or 
reporting of information.
255
 
Realistically, the statute only prohibits jurisdictions from imposing 
restrictions on the sharing of collected information.
256
  An argument under 
the Supremacy Clause would likely fail, because no inconsistency with the 
language of the statute is created by sanctuary policies.
257
  Courts may 
conclude, and many scholars have agreed, that “sanctuary policies [are] not 
[in] violat[ion] [of] 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”258 
Albeit this interpretation of the statute is probable, some jurisdictions 
opted to accept the request of the federal government and vowed to strictly 
implement the statute.
259
  Under the pressure of the DOJ, the Mayor of 
Miami-Dade County ordered jails to comply with detainer requests from 
federal officials—a decision later upheld by the county commission.260 
V. FLORIDA LOCALITIES 
The State of Florida is no stranger to the debate around sanctuary 
jurisdictions and possible defunding from the federal government.
261
  As a 
final destination to many immigrants, both legal and illegal, Florida contains 
                                                                                                                             
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive 
constitutional yardstick. 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
255. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703 (emphasis in original). 
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b). 
257. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Bd. of Supervisors of the 
Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010).  But see Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra 
note 102, at 10–12. 
258. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2 
(emphasis in original); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
259. See Skyler Swisher, Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary’ Counties by Trump Spurs 
Policy Change in Miami-Dade, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2017, at B3; Elise Foley, 
Miami-Dade Will Abandon ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Policies After Trump Order, Mayor 
Says, HUFFPOST: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-
dade-sanctuary-city_us_588a887ee4b0230ce61b0476. 
260. See Swisher, supra note 259; Foley, supra note 259; Alan Gomez, Miami-
Dade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017, 
8:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-
grapples-sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/. 
261. Foley, supra note 259; Swisher, supra note 259. 
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one of the highest foreign-born populations in the country.
262
  In the twenty-
five year span between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of foreign-born 
residents of Florida grew from 12.9% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2015.
263
  
According to the 2015 census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey, over four million Florida residents are foreign 
born.
264
  Among them, 75.1% were born in Latin America.
265
  Online data 
sources show that Florida has, within its territory, about two dozen 
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies including Broward County, Palm Beach 
County, and Miami Beach.
266
  However, many jurisdictions disagree with the 
label of sanctuary that has been given to them.
267
  Both Broward County and 
Palm Beach County affirmed their compliance with federal immigration 
laws.
268
  Nevertheless, actions taken by the Sheriff’s Department in both 
counties may be considered otherwise.
269
  Broward County Sheriff’s Office 
stopped honoring ICE detainers after courts ruled them unconstitutional in 
2014.
270
  Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office also enforces similar detainer 
procedures.
271
  Moreover, in an attempt to appease their large immigrant 
communities, Broward County passed a resolution defining itself as “an 
inclusive county which welcomes, celebrates, and offers refuge to all 
residents and visitors irrespective of race, religion, ethnicity, or national 
                                                     
262. See State Immigration Data Profiles: California, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/CA (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/FL (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: New York, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/NY (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Texas, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/TX (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). 
263. State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. See Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA, 
OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017). 
267. See Swisher, supra note 259. 
268. See id. 
269. See Rebecca Sharpless, Dade, Broward Lead the Way, MIAMI HERALD 
(July 24, 2014, 6:09 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article1976943.html. 
270. Larry Barszewski, Broward Seeks Sanctuary from ‘Sanctuary’ Label, SUN 
SENTINAL: BROWARD POL. (Mar. 14, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/local/broward/broward-politics-blog/fl-blog-broward-sanctuary-city-20170314-
story.html. 
271. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Report Shows Law Enforcement 
Agencies in at Least 30 Florida Counties Would be Punished by Proposed Anti-Immigrant 
Law (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/report-shows-law-enforcement-
agencies-least-30-florida-counties-would-be-punished. 
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origin.”272  Parallel efforts were also made by the City of West Palm Beach, 
which declared itself “a welcoming city for immigrants.”273  Although non-
compliance with ICE detainers is among the types of conduct that the 
Executive Order is trying to eliminate, it is not established whether friendly 
relationships with immigrant communities risk labeling Florida jurisdictions 
as sanctuaries.
274
  However, one thing is clear:  Some degree of confusion 
exists regarding the conduct targeted by the Executive Order and the possible 
consequences for non-complying jurisdictions.
275
 
Florida State Legislators, however, are trying to solve some of the 
issues and to untie the Gordian Knot.
276
  The Florida House of 
Representatives approved a bill “prohibiting local law enforcement from 
resisting compliance with federal immigration laws and [detainer] requests” 
from ICE.
277
  Although the bill will unlikely become law—because no 
discussion has occurred yet on the floor of the Senate—legislators are 
showing anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the Executive 
Order.
278
  However, the Florida House of Representatives is not the first 
legislating body within state boundaries to adopt policies in compliance with 
federal requests.
279
 
                                                     
272. Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 2017–030, § 1 (2017); Chris Persaud, 
Six Federal Grants to South Florida That Trump Could Threaten Under Sanctuary Cities 
Order, WLRN (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.wlrn.org/post/six-federal-grants-south-florida-
trump-could-threaten-under-sanctuary-cities-order. 
273. See Peter Haden, West Palm Beach Declares Itself ‘Welcoming City’ for 
Immigrants, WGCU (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://news.wgcu.org/post/west-palm-beach-
declares-itself-welcoming-city-immigrants. 
274. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); 
Garrett Epps, Trump’s Sloppy, Unconstitutional Order on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
30, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trumps-sloppy-
unconstitutional-order-on-sanctuary-cities/514883/; Persaud, supra note 272. 
275. See Barszewski, supra note 270; Sacchetti & Horwitz, supra note 228. 
276. See Kristen M. Clark, Florida House Approves Ban—and Penalties—on 
‘Sanctuary’ Cities, MIAMI HERALD, (Apr. 28, 2017, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article147453654.html. 
277. Id. 
278. Id.; see also Daniel Ducassi, Bill Cracking Down on ‘Sanctuary Cities’ 
Clears First Committee Stop, POLITICO: FLA. (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/03/bill-cracking-down-on-sanctuary-cities-
clears-first-committee-stop-110339.  The bill, later affirmed by the Florida House, compels 
state and local governments to support enforcement of federal immigration law, barring the 
creation and implementation of any law or practice hindering the operations of federal 
officers.  Ducassi, supra; see also Clark, supra note 276.  The bill is a response to judicial 
injunctions of the Executive Order, and bypasses constitutional challenges to the Executive 
Order through state action.  See Ducassi, supra. 
279. See Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cty., to 
Daniel Junior, Interim Dir., Corrections & Rehab. Dep’t (Jan. 26, 2017). 
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A. Miami-Dade County 
Miami-Dade is the only county in the United States where foreign-
born residents constitute the majority.
280
  According to the latest census data 
from the United States Census Bureau, 51.7% of Miami-Dade County’s 
population is foreign-born, with a heavy majority being of Hispanic or 
Latino heritage.
281
  Yet, on January 26, 2017, the day after President Trump 
signed the Executive Order, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez 
announced his agreement with the new policies.
282
  The Mayor released a 
memorandum to all county jails, directing them to observe federal detainer 
requests.
283
  The memorandum stated that, “[i]n light of the provisions of the 
Executive Order, I direct . . . to honor all immigration detainer requests 
received from the Department of Homeland Security.  Miami-Dade County 
complies with federal law and intends to fully cooperate with the [F]ederal 
[G]overnment.”284  In an effort to avoid the label of sanctuary city, thus 
risking sanctions in the form of cuts in federal funding, Miami-Dade County 
Commissioners voted in favor of the mayoral policy.
285
  The decision 
reversed a previous county policy, approved in 2013, opposing detention as a 
result of detainer requests from federal agencies.
286
 
The 2013 policy created a two-fold threshold to allow detainers.
287
  
First, for the county to allow ICE detainers, the federal government had to 
agree to reimburse all costs associated with the detention—an agreement 
which had to be in writing.
288
  Second, once the reimbursement was agreed 
                                                     
280. See State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262; U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida/POP060210 (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2017). 
281. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 280. 
282. Jonathan Levin, Miami’s Mayor Climbs Aboard the Trump Train, 
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/miami-s-mayor-climbs-aboard-the-
trump-train; Kate Samuelson, Miami-Dade Is No Longer a ‘Sanctuary’ for Undocumented 
Immigrants, TIME: MIAMI (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.time.com/4651518/miami-dade-mayor-
sanctuary-city-donald-trump/. 
283. Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez to Daniel Junior, supra note 279. 
284. Id. 
285. Patricia Mazzei & Douglas Hanks, Fearing Trump, Commission Drops 
Miami-Dade’s ‘Sanctuary’ Protections, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:05 PM) 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article133413384.html. 
286. See id.; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Plans to Stop Paying for Federal 
Immigration Detentions, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1958627.html. 
287. See Letter from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Florida et al., to 
Miami-Dade Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 3–4 (Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with ACLU of Florida). 
288. Id. at 4. 
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upon, detainers would be implemented only against individuals charged or 
convicted of certain enumerated offenses—principally felonies.289  Although 
the Board of County Commissioners passed a resolution upholding the anti-
detainer policies in December of 2013, the tide changed quickly after 
President Trump signed the Executive Order, and a February vote by the 
same body reinstated full cooperation for detainers.
290
  The county’s 
decisions have already presented legal consequences.
291
 
1. Lacroix v. Junior 
On March 3, 2017, Judge Milton Hirsch of the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County ruled the detention of James Lacroix, 
a Haitian national, unconstitutional.
292
  Judge Hirsch found the coercive 
conduct of ICE, pushing the Miami-Dade County jail to continue to 
incarcerate Lacroix, a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
293
  Questioning the 
constitutionality of the detainer, and denying the Miami-Dade County 
alleged sanctuary city status, Judge Hirsch affirmed that:  “[T]he issue raised 
. . . has nothing to do with affording sanctuary to those unlawfully in this 
country.  It has everything to do with the separation of powers between the 
state and federal governments as reflected in the Tenth Amendment to, and 
in the very structure of, the United States Constitution.”294 
The jail’s decision to comply with ICE’s demands to detain Lacroix 
is, in the words of Judge Hirsch, “a demand with which the local government 
is constitutionally prohibited from complying.”295  The beneficiaries of the 
                                                     
289. Id. 
290. See Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s 
‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-grapples-
sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285. 
291. See Elise Foley & Cristian Farias, Judge Rebukes Miami-Dade County for 
Appeasing Trump on ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, HUFFPOST: POL. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-dade-sanctuary-
trump_us_58b9d325e4b05cf0f4008a46; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285. 
292. Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, 15, Lacroix v. Junior, 
No. F17-376, 2017 WL 1037453, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017); David Ovalle, Judge 
Shoots Down Miami-Dade Detention Policy Adopted to Follow Trump Deportation Order, 
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article136179733.html; 
Kalhan Rosenblatt, Miami-Dade’s Policy of Holding Inmates for ICE Is Unconstitutional:  
Florida Judge, NBC: NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/miami-s-policy-holding-inmates-ice-unconstitutional-florida-judge-n728786. 
293. See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9–11. 
294. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
295. Id. at 8.  “It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to 
insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national 
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constitutional structure are the people, whose rights and liberties are 
protected through a strong-willed local government in opposition to a heavy-
handed federal government.
296
 
Judge Hirsch’s ruling lends way to the fact that, regardless of 
whether or not a jurisdiction is a sanctuary—and regardless of the fact that 
local agencies and officials support President Trump’s crackdown on 
immigration—there are constitutional rights afforded to every person in this 
country, legal or illegal, which simply cannot be infringed upon.
297
 
2. Creedle v. Gimenez 
Tenth Amendment violations, however, are not the only claims that 
have been raised against Miami-Dade County as a result of the new 
policies.
298
  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Florida, in 
conjunction with the University of Miami School of Law’s Immigration 
Clinic, filed a federal suit against the county for violation of the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
299
  In Creedle v. Gimenez,
300
 
the action was filed on behalf of Garland Creedle, an American citizen 
voluntarily detained by Miami-Dade County in response to an ICE 
detainer.
301
  After being arrested on the evening of March 12, 2017, Creedle 
was fingerprinted by county correctional officials.
302
  After receiving an 
immigration detainer from ICE, correctional officers refused to release 
Creedle upon bond being posted.
303
  Although notified that Creedle was an 
American citizen by Creedle himself, county correctional officers did not 
release him until the next day.
304
 
The Fourth Amendment violation, alleged by the ACLU, is a direct 
result of the nature of the ICE detainers implemented by Miami-Dade.
305
  
                                                                                                                             
government, nowhere delegated or [e]ntrusted . . . to them by the Constitution.”  Id. (quoting 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)). 
296. See id. at 8–9. 
297. See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 14. 
298. See Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Citizen Detained by Mistake Sues Miami-
Dade Over Immigration Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/us/immigration-sanctuary-lawsuit-miami.html. 
299. Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief at 12, 15, Creedle v. 
Gimenez, No. 1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017); Dickerson, supra note 298. 
300. Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, Creedle v. Gimenez, No. 
1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017). 
301. Id. at 1. 
302. Id. at 9. 
303. Id. at 11. 
304. Id. at 1011. 
305. See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 
1112. 
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Since detainers are issued by immigration officers, the procedure lacks the 
necessary “probable cause determination by a detached and neutral” 
magistrate.
306
  It is indeed only logical that an immigration officer, due to the 
basic nature of his position, can hardly be a neutral and detached 
adjudicator.
307
  For the alleged violations perpetrated against him, Creedle is 
seeking compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any additional 
equitable relief deemed appropriate by the court.
308
  The absence of probable 
cause, added to the often nonexistent presence of an arrest warrant, exposes 
Miami-Dade County and its correctional agencies to hypothetically infinite 
legal liability, with the costs taken on by taxpayers.
309
 
B. What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida Jurisdictions? 
Cities throughout the state risk losing “hundreds of millions of 
dollars” in federal funding if found not in compliance with the directives of 
the Executive Order.
310
  However, the exact amount will depend on the 
interpretation of the language of the Executive Order and the exact nature of 
the targeted grants.
311
  Summed together, the counties of Palm Beach, 
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe received a total of $565 million in grants 
from the federal government in 2016 alone.
312
  The funds are used for 
programs in different areas, from education and public health, to 
transportation and housing.
313
  Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract previous 
county policies regarding detainers is likely a response to the threat of losing 
hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding.
314
  In fact, “Miami-Dade 
County is due to receive $355 million” in federal government money that the 
county cannot afford to lose.
315
  In an effort to explain the rationale behind 
the choice made, Gimenez affirmed that losing federal funding to keep 
implementing restrictions on detainer requests is not worth the risk.
316
  And 
although Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract county policies is 
                                                     
306. Id. at 10, 12. 
307. Id. at 10. 
308. Id. at 14. 
309. Id. at 5, 7–8. 
310. Persaud, supra note 272. 
311. See id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. See Serafin Gomez, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with 
Detention Requests After Trump’s ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, FOX NEWS: POL. (Jan. 27, 
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/27/miami-dade-mayor-orders-jails-to-
comply-with-detention-requests-after-trumps-sanctuary-city-crackdown.html; Sanchez et al., 
supra note 17. 
315. See Gomez, supra note 314. 
316. See Pazmino et al., supra note 60; Sanchez et al., supra note 17. 
41
Macelloni: A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powe
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
136 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
understandable under the circumstances, it is exactly the type of coerced 
reaction the Constitution protects against.
317
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judge William H. Orrick III of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California issued a court order granting a motion for 
nationwide injunction of section 9(a) of the Executive Order.
318
  After being 
requested to revisit the Order in light of the Attorney General’s 
memorandum clarifying the language of the Executive Order, Judge Orrick 
confirmed the injunction, leaving President Trump with a difficult task:  
Solve immigration problems and appease the electorate without infringing 
upon constitutional rights and principles.
319
  The power of states to 
implement and enforce their own laws is one of the cornerstones of 
American democracy.
320
  Compelling states, counties, municipalities, and 
other local jurisdictions into enforcing federal immigration laws threatens the 
system’s balance, and violates the Constitution so dear to most.321 
The independence of state and local jurisdictions has been 
established by the Founding Fathers in hopes of a new, better world, 
distinguishing itself from the crooked, corrupted, oppressive Motherland.
322
  
Centralization of power is a dangerous threat to democracy, and risks 
shifting constitutional balances to a direction of no return.
323
  The question 
that should be asked is whether we, as a democracy, prefer independent, 
empowered, knowledgeable, competent, engaged, and accountable local 
governments and representatives ruling over us, or a distant, centralized, 
controlling federal government.
324
  In promoting the ratification of the 
Constitution, James Madison affirmed that: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
[F]ederal [G]overnment are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State [G]overnments are numerous and indefinite.  
                                                     
317. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Sanchez et al., 
supra note 17. 
318. Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & County of San 
Francisco’s Motions, supra note 97, at 1, 29–30. 
319. Id. at 25, 30; see also Dan Levine, Judge Refuses to Remove Block on 
Trump Sanctuary City Order, REUTERS: POL. (July 20, 2017, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ruling-idUSKBN1A531K. 
320. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
321. See id. at 920–21. 
322. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012); 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 920–21. 
323. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29. 
324. See id. 
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The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as 
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce . . . .  The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, 
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State.
325
 
The right answer may have indeed been given by James Madison in 
his promotion of the Constitution, on January 26, 1788.
326
  Although an 
injunction is currently in place, there still exists a real possibility that the 
Attorney General, Secretary of State, and President Trump may enforce the 
stated intent of the Executive Order to the detriment of states and localities 
around the country, including within Florida.
327
  “[H]undreds of millions of 
dollars” in federal grants could be taken away, to the disadvantage of the 
people in communities that rely upon the funding.
328
  Clarification—by the 
courts or the President himself—of the federal funds involved and the 
sanctuary jurisdictions that will be impacted needs to be made clear, so that 
states can make rational and knowledgeable decisions as to whether to 
comply with the Executive Order.
329
 
325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 205, at 262 (James Madison). 
326. See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Project 
Gutenberg ed.). 
327. See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 1; 
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9; Levine, supra note 319. 
328. See Persaud, supra note 272. 
329. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1, 
3.
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